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M. R. Goode*

The Law Reform Commission
of Canada, Barnes and
Marlin, and The
Value-Consensus Model:
More About Ideology.

1. Introduction
Barnes and Marlin have attacked the original paper written by me
about the Law Reform Commission of Canada and the ideology of
criminal process reform. The discussion which follows is not
limited to being my response to their response: such a discussion
would be fruitless and introverted to the point of boredom. Thus,
although some of the discussion begins with Barnes and Marlin, it is
not intended to end there, for indeed Barnes and Marlin have not
really discussed much of the original comment at all. Their paper
contains some discussion of the notion of consensus although, it is
submitted, their discussion is largely a product of misunderstanding. However, Barnes and Marlin have not discussed any other
attribute of the value-consensus model at all, nor have they dealt
with the specific examples and criticisms raised in the original
paper. Barnes and Marlin do not deal with the quite substantial body
of literature, referred to and discussed in the original paper, which
has surrounded the debate concerning the ideology of the criminal
process and the criminal law, both as it is and as it should be.
The discussion which follows is divided into three parts and each
part is concerned with a different aspect of the response by Barnes
and Marlin and some thoughts which flow from that response. The
first part is concerned principally with what appears to be a
misunderstanding by Barnes and Marlin of the purposes and
objectives of the original paper. These purposes and objectives are
further discussed. The second part of the paper is concerned with
the notion of consensus: whether the Law Reform Commission has
adopted a particular mode of criminal process ideology and
considerations which flow from that disagreement between myself
and Barnes and Marlin. The third part of the paper is concerned with
the specific issue of abortion in relation to the issue of acceptance by
*University of Adelaide, South Australia; appreciation is expressed to Mr. A.
Perry, Lecturer in Law, University of Adelaide, for his advice and assistance.
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the Commission of the status quo in substance of the present social
order.
2. Inconsistency and the Purposes of the OriginalComment
Barnes and Marlin make, inter alia, two specific criticisms of the
original comment which I shall deal with together for reasons of
relevance and convenience. The first of these is the statement:
it is noteworthy that Goode himself gives little hint as to his own
view of the way in which the legal system should be remodelled. 1
The implication, and indeed the reason for "noteworthiness", is
that I should have outlined my own "philosophy" for criminal law
reform, and was sadly remiss in not doing so. The second, related,
criticism is essentially one of inconsistency. Barnes and Marlin
examine my original comment in much the same way as I examined
the writings of the Law Reform Commission, and conclude that at
one stage I appeal to the value of consensus, and at two other points,
I appear to favour the contrary model. 2 This criticism is obviously
related to the argument that I should have outlined my own
"philosophy" for criminal law reform.
The short answer to both of these criticisms is that Barnes and
Marlin have so far misunderstood the aims and objectives of the
original paper, for the desideratum was not a consideration which
the paper was designed to resolve. In that paper, I sought to
demonstrate that there exist in present criminological thought two
conflicting paradigms or models allegedly consistent with the way
in which Western society and social authority operates and has
operated. The two models, labelled in an a priori manner as
"value-consensus" and "value-antagonism" are, in my submission, opposing poles of thought, determined by each other, and the
tension between them is of particular relevance to the criminal
process and its reform. Yet, despite the fact that the Law Reform
Commission of Canada has avowed that it shall take a
"philosophical" approach to law reform, 3 it has not discussed in
1. Barnes and Marlin, "Radical Criminology and the Law Reform Commission of
Canada - A Reply to Professor M. R. Goode" (1977), 4 Dal. L.J. 151, at 155;
hereinafter referred to as Barnes and Marlin
2. Id.
"Indeed he seems to appeal approvingly to the very consensus model which he
attacks (or more frequently reports as having been attacked by others)."
Why it should matter whether I report it as being attacked more frequently by others
than by myself is a matter quite beyond me. But let it pass.
3. See, for example, Barnes, "The Law Reform Commission of Canada" (1975),
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print this conflict of paradigms central to the "philosophy" of the
criminal process. Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain precisely the
nature of the actual philosophy adopted by the Commission in its
working papers and suggestions for reform. Thus, the original paper
contained a second purpose, for I thought then, and think now, that
the Commission had adopted without qualification or explanation, a
model of social authority closely resembling one of the posited
models, and that an inadequate consideration of "philosophy" had
led the Commission into particular and specified errors.
My first criticism of the Commission was thus a very simple one.
Despite an avowed philosophical outlook:
There has been no real philosophical enquiry, no reasoned
discussion of the continuing dialectic of criminal process models
which keeps the area in a constant "state of crisis"...4
And Barnes and Marlin do not, and indeed can not show that the
Commission has publicly and rationally discussed the way in which
social authority has operated and should operate and the reasons for
preferring that view over others. It is ironic that Barnes and Marlin
cannot appreciate that the reason why I chose to proceed by a
method that they are pleased to call, inaccurately, 5 "guilt by
association",6 is precisely the same reason why they feel compelled
to do precisely the same thing in their attempt to show that I am
inconsistent in my own views. Barnes and Marlin draw implications
from the original paper and identify them with one model or the
other because I nowhere state my own views on the matter
explicitly. 7 I drew implications from Commission papers because
nowhere does the Commission state its views on the matter
2 Dal. L.J. 62 at 72-73 and Barnes, "Criminal Law Reform; Canadian Style",
[1976] Crim. L.R. 299-300.
4. Goode, "Law Reform Commission of Canada - Political Ideology of Criminal
Process Reform" (1976), 54 Can. B.R. 653 at 670
5. The use of the term is inaccurate. Guilt by association is a term usually applied
to a process whereby a person is found to be guilty of a crime or charge because of
his or here association with a thought, another person, or a political party. In the
sense in which Barnes and Marlin use it, the phrase covers the whole operation of
the criminal law: for what is a finding of guilt of any crime but a finding of an
association between a person and a crime? I do not find the Commission "guilty"
of adhering to the value consensus model by association in a very general way.
Surely it is not guilt by association to analyze what its philosophy of reform may be
and to come to a conclusion, except by a meaningless use of that phrase. See, for
example, O'Brian, "Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association" (1948), 61 H.L.R.
592
6. Barnes and Marlin at 156
7. Supra, note 1.
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explicitly. Unlike the Law Reform Commission however, I have
never claimed to be proposing law reform on a philosophical basis. I
do not state my own views because they are not relevant to the
objectives of my paper. Instead, I chose to highlight the
philosophical sterility of the Commission.
So far from being able to rebut this criticism, Barnes and Marlin
admit its truth in at least two, major, respects. First, on the matter of
"core values", a matter allegedly at the very heart of the reform of
the criminal process, 8 it is said:
• .. there are certain core values ...

which people agree that the

law should be used to protect and [the Commission] has sought to
identify these . . . it is obviously difficult to articulate these

values in any other than a general way and this has led to frequent
charges of vagueness made against the Commission. 9
Core values may well be hard to define if they do not exist and yet
the Commission has not discussed a significant philosophical
literature which argues that, indeed, they do not. Neither do Barnes
and Marlin. Moreover, this passage carries the implication that law
reform should proceed upon the basis of rather generally described,
undefined, "core values" because, as in the celebrated obscenity
dictum, "we" may not be able to define it, but "we" know one
when "we" see it. 10 It is submitted that the real point is that the
Commission is in this important respect guilty of the charge: for it
has concededly been unable to define the concept at the very heart
of its "philosophy", despite the fact that a lot of people are said to
agree upon it. The proffered excuse is that such a task is not an easy
one: but then, it has never been alleged that the philosophy of the
criminal process and its application to good law reform is an easy
task.
The second and similar concession is much clearer and to the
point. Barnes and Marlin concede:
.. . the Commission might be faulted for giving insufficient

expression to the limitations on consensus in its published
writings. . .. 11

That is precisely the point, albeit in more moderate language. It is
submitted that the phrase "might be faulted", carrying with it the
8. For the relevant quotations and discussion in the original paper, see Goode,
supra, note 4 at 654-655, 658, and 671-672
9. Barnes and Marlin at 153
10. With apologies to Stewart J. inJacobellisv. Ohio (1963), 378 U.S. 184 at 197
11. Barnes and Marlin at 154-155
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notion of triviality, is inadequate bearing in mind the avowal and
proclamation of a philosophical approach. The use of the word
"insufficient" is also misleading insofar as Barnes and Marlin are
unable to show that the Commission has considered or discussed
any coherent alternative to the value-consensus model: indeed, the
fault is seen by them as one relating to the limits of the notion of
consensus rather than as relevant to its very utility. A few
neo-liberal cosmetic qualifications to an overall basis of consensus
is no substitute for a reasoned philosophical discussion of the
fundamental nature of the criminal process, as it is and as it should
be.
In short, then, my omission to describe in detail the way in which
I personally should like to see the philosophy of the criminal process
reform is neither "noteworthy" nor culpable. It was not among the
purposes of the original comment, and it was not relevant to these
purposes. Nor should it have been, for constructive criticism may
take the form of identifying weaknesses without providing
comprehensive solutions. Indeed, I may have no firm philosophical
views at all. My interest in the whole topic under discussion was
prompted originally by a disappointment that the Commission had
not lived up to its philosophical promise, for such a debate and
discussion provides the best environment for the formation of an
ideology or philosophy.
Turning now to the allegation of inconsistency, 12 it is necessary
to look to the three passages in question, two of which are allegedly
consistent with the value-consensus model, and one of which is
allegedly consistent with the value-antagonism model. The essence
of the following response is that none of the three passages will
support the implications alleged to be drawn from them.
First Barnes and Marlin suggest that I appeal to the value
consensus model because I state that the imposition of the morals or
core values of one group by that group upon another group is a Bad
Thing. 13 They further suggest that I must believe it is a Bad Thing
because the imposed-upon group does not agree with the morals or
values of the imposing group:1 4 that is, because there is no
consensus. Therefore I must adhere to the value-consensus model.
That is an invalid conclusion for two reasons.
12. Supra, note 2.
13. Barnes and Marlin at 155
14. Id.
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First, and most importantly, it is absurd to suggest that every
person who is of the opinion that the implication of morals upon one
group in society by another group in society is a Bad Thing must
adhere the value-consensus model. Much of "radical criminology"
is directed toward demonstrating that just such a state of affairs
exists and is a Bad Thing. 15 The reasons for objection are far more
complex than Barnes and Marlin suggest, and, like most aspects of
ideology, are very difficult to explain. I would like to try, through
the medium of two related comments. First, part of the comment
under discussion related to hypocrisy. The point is that the
imposition is done in Western democratic society behind a
"facade" of consensus as to core values. It bothers me that nowhere
does the Commission define what it means by "consensus" and
nowhere does the Commission define what it means by "corevalues". These concepts raise endless unanswered questions. What
is a consensus? Is it a majority, a plurality or a totality of opinion or
none of these? And how does the law find out whether there is a
consensus or not? Is that process an accurate one? Does the
consensus mean that people agree with a value or that they want to
enforce it against other people by law, or both? And what is a core
value? Yet we are all asked to accept on faith, that these questions
may be satisfactorily answered and that the law in question is made
and enforced on the basis of that consensus and that core value.
Thus, my point was that the consensus model may easily be used as
a facade for something altogether different - legislation in the
criminal process where there is no consensus. Because of this lack
of a philosophical discussion, because of this lack of definition of
basic fundamental concepts, it is very easy to use the notion of
consensus to justify legislation not based on consensus. 16
The second comment is that adherents of a value-consensus
model often suggest that the fact that there exists a consensus and it
does concern a core-value is a sufficient condition to justify
legislation. If true, that is a very important philosophical principle,
and it is rendered almost meaningless because the Commission has
not discussed what distinguishes a core-value from any other value.
For example, there is a moral rule that men shall not wear a hat in
15. This matter is discussed at length in the original paper: supra, note 4 at 664ff.
Barnes and Marlin, of course, do not discuss it at all. See also, as a further
example, Young, The Drugtakers (1971)
16. And hence the original comment about the facade of consensus. See Goode,
supra, note 4 at 672
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church: and one may assume that most people in the community
agree with that rule. If, and only if, that is so, then upon the general
principle, that moral rule is not law because it is not a
"core-value". Perhaps it is not a core-value because people do not
feel sufficiently strongly about the matter to enforce it by law. But
let it be assumed that there is a rash of hat wearing, and a committee
is set up to include the crime in the Criminal Code. Should the rule
then become law, assuming that a consensus exists? I would submit
that the measure should not be made law, even so, for many
reasons. For example, the purpose of the legislation is, religious
reasons aside, excessively trivial, 16A and the conduct to be
prohibited does not, in any sense, "harm" any person. In short, the
rationality of the content and purpose of the specific law may well
be determinative. For example, I approve strongly of most, but not
all, 17 of the ways in which a majority of governments have
attempted to impose their morality of racism upon the government
of South Africa which holds a different morality of racism. It is
quite apparent that the imposition of a moral code by one social
group upon another is not objectionable only because there exists,
ex hypothesi, no consensus.
The second reason why that is an invalid conclusion relates to the
lack of a reasoned discussion of the notion of consensus, and, in
particular, a strange comment by Barnes and Marlin. They suggest
that the notion of consensus used by the Commission includes the
notion that there is a consensus when there is a consensus that there
is no consensus.' 8 If this amazing proposition can be accepted, then
it is quite clear that the potential for the imposition of a moral code
by one social group upon another is limitless. Legislation based on
consensus may thus be based upon a consensus that there is no
16A. A recent example is the prosecution in England of "Gay News" for the
common law offence of blasphemy. The Roman Catholic paper The Tablet,

23/7/77 at 691 comments uider a heading: "Judge not...":
'"it is right', as The Times put it, 'to respect other men's gods', but is it wrong
to exact such respect through the sanctions of the criminal law."
17. My objections to other methods relate to the ethics of the use of force and to
the idea of proportion between offence and solution. That kind of balance, like the
morality of deterrence, is also vital. See Andanaes, "The Morality of Deterrence"
(1970), 30 U. Chi. L.R. 648
18. Barnes and Marlin, at 154:
"... consensus should be sought, even if the consensus is merely agreement of
differ."
If this is true, then there can only be no consensus if there is no consensus about
whether or not there is a consensus or not.
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consensus. The original comment is thus enhanced.
The second passage allegedly containing the implication of an
appeal to consensus quoted by Barnes and Marlin occurred at the
conclusion of the original paper, and contained an appeal for further
public and academic debate. 19 Barnes and Marlin conclude that that
can only be an appeal to consensus. 2 0 This is an invalid conclusion,
for it is absurd to suggest that the only possible objective in dialogue
and debate is consensus. As the Commission itself has said, another
proper objective is education, 2 1 and, no doubt, there are others.
Mere curiosity as to an existing state of affairs may also provide an
acceptable motive. It is suggested that no firm conclusions about
adherence to either model may be made thereby from a call for
public discussion. Indeed, the dangers involved in such a course are
amply demonstrated by Barnes and Marlin themselves. The learned
authors state that the Commission itself acts upon a basis of
dialogue and debate with the public. 22 The application of logic
similar to that employed by Barnes and Marlin should lead one to
the conclusion that the Commission appeals to consensus and thus
adheres to a value-consensus model. But that is not so, for Barnes
and Marlin are not only concerned to deny that the Commission had
adopted such a model 2 3 but also, and here is the rub, cite the
two-way, educational approach of the Commission, involving
dialogue with the public, as a reason why the Commission cannot be
said to have adopted a value consensus model. 24 It is evident that
Barnes and Marlin cannot have it both ways, but the point is that no
implication can be drawn from such evidence, either about myself
or about the Commission.
Lastly, attention must be paid to the passage which allegedly
shows my adherence to the Value-antagonism model. Logically, the
19. Barnes and Marlin at 155
20. Ibid.: "Why should one have this hope unless one felt - as the Commission
plainly feels - that such discussion would promote harmony and agreement."
21. See, for example, Barnes, "Criminal Law Reform, Canadian Style", 1976]
Crim. L.R. 299.
22. Barnes and Marlin at 5:
"[The Commission prefers] . . . continual informed debate. It then becomes
difficult to see how Goode can accuse the Commission of promoting unitary
interests." (emphasis added)
23. Barnes and Marlin at 5.
24. Id.
"[The

Commission] ...

could hardly be taken to hold a consensus-is-

everything philosophy. Such a view would be contradictedby its stress on a

two-way educational approach - where the Commission analyzes, evaluates
and enters into dialogue with the public." (emphasis added).
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authors point out that I describe a Commission view as based on the
value-consensus model, that I describe that view as "erroneous",
and that the two models are antagonistic is evidence of my
adherence to the value antagonism model. 2, 5 The problem with such
reasoning is that, although I described the Commission view as
"erroneous", I specifically did not describe the value-consensus
model as "erroneous". The purpose of the passage quoted by
Barnes and Marlin was to point out that first, since the logic of the
Commission view reflected the logic of the value-consensus model,
that made it more likely that the Commission had adopted that
model and second, to demonstrate that the particular recommendation was absurd by use of specific examples. 2 6 On this occasion I go
further and remark that quite possibly, the failure of the
Commission to define core values and the opinion of the
Commission that the crime of murder need not be defined precisely
may well be related. After all, if one cannot define the values upon
which a law is to be based, it is very difficult to frame a law
consistent with these values. Perhaps one of the limits of the notion
of consensus is that although it may be possible to achieve a
consensus, however defined, upon the ukase "Thou shalt not kill",
consensus as to the limits of that rule is impossible to achieve.
Clearly, for example, policemen need the right to kill in extreme
situations,2 7 and what about such things as provocation, self
defence, causation, duress, insanity, automatism, mens rea and so
on. Barnes and Marlin do not discuss the given example; indeed,
they discuss very few of the specific points and criticisms contained
in the original paper.
3. Whether or Not the Philosophy of the Law Reform Commission
is Properly Described as Conforming to the Value-Consensus
Model.
Barnes and Marlin profess surprise that, of all the law reform bodies
which exist, I should choose to direct my remarks to the Law
Reform Commission of Canada. 2 8 They go on to show to their own
25. Barnes and Marlin at 152-3: "implied acceptance"
26. R. v. Blaue, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1411; [1975] 3 All E.R. 446, (C.C.A); R. v.
Paquette (1974), 5. 0.R. (2d.) 1; 19 C.C.C. (2d.) 154, (Ont. C.A.)
27. Or at least, let it be assumed that this is true or that there is a consensus about
it, or whatever else is sufficient.
28. Barnes and Marlin at 153; "An initial reaction . . .is likely to be surprise
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satisfaction that in fact, the Commission has in its philosophy been
"consistent" with the findings of "radical" criminology. 29 Apart
from the fact that no specific example is discussed or provided by
Barnes and Marlin, that is, of course, not the point. Barnes and
Marlin cannot show and do not show that the coherent alternatives
to the value consensus perspective have been discussed or
presented. Nevertheless, there is the additional question: is it
accurate to describe the Commission's philosphy as a valueconsensus philosophy?
I suggest that this is principally a question of definition, and that I
am as much at fault as the Commission and Barnes and Marlin in
defining ambiguously. However, I am also of the opinion that the
issue is not really in doubt. The definitional problem will be
revealed by an examination of the passage in which Barnes and
Marlin summarize the reason why the Commission cannot be
accused of adopting value-consensus philosophy. They state:
... it [the Commission] could hardly be taken to hold a
consensus-is-everything philosophy. Such a view would be
contradicted by its stress on a two-way educational approach where the Commission analyzes, evaluates and enters into
dialogue with the public."
The definitional problem is at once apparent. Barnes and Marlin are
clearly of the opinion that, for the identification of the Commission
with the value consensus model, it must be shown that pure,
undiluted consensus is the raison d'etre for existence. That
consensus is everything. Thus, the Barnes and Marlin defence of the
Commission is based upon the argument that, for the Commission,
"consensus is not the whole story". 31 That in turn raises two
questions for examination. First, it is true that for the Commission,
consensus is not the whole story"? Secondly, are Barnes and Marlin
correct in their definition of this aspect of the value consensus
model?
By way of introduction to that discussion, however, it should first
be pointed out that it has been submitted above 32 that there is
absolutely no relevant connection between my original discussion of
alternative social philosophies and whether or not the Commission
engaged in dialogue and debate. The reason given for the
29.
30.
31.
32.

Barnes and Marlin at 153
Barnes and Marlin at 155
Barnes and Marlin at 154
Supra, notes 19-24
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conclusion in the passage quoted above that the Commission does
not hold a consensus-is-everything philosophy is not a sufficient
reason for that conclusion.
Is it right to assume that the value-consensus model requires the
view that "consensus is everything"? The short answer is that it is
not. Neither I nor any of the sources cited by me in the original
paper define the consensus model so strictly that it applies only to
persons or institutions who regard consensus as everything. This
process of definition is the key to one of Barnes' and Marlin's
misunderstandings; for they here demonstrate the simplistic notion
that the issue of philosophy can be seen in absolute dichotomies; in
black and white. 33 That is clearly not so, and Barnes and Marlin
give no reason for their definition, nor cite a similar one. It is
submitted that it is evident that what is important to this aspect of
the value consensus model is the notion that consensus, however
defined, is central to the operation of society and social authority
and a justification for law.
And indeed it is submitted that on Barnes' and Marlin's account,
the Commission has adopted a value-consensus model. It is evident
from their discussion that to the Commission, consensus as to
values is very important. 34 Moreover, Barnes and Marlin have
produced no evidence or argument which in any way undermines
my original assertion that the only structured and organized social
philosophy appearing in the publications of the Commission is that
of value-consensus. The fact that some isolated statements may be
seen as consistent with an alternative philosophy means nothing
unless it can be shown that philosophy is employed or considered as
a coherent system of thought. However, it is also important to look
to these isolated statements and what they mean.
In order to support the notion that, to the Commission, consensus
is not everything, Barnes and Marlin cite two specific examples.
Both, however, are examples of issues on which the Law Reform
Commission has not acted because there is no consensus. Thus, it
refused to suggest reform of the criminal law relating to offences
against property because there is no consensus 3 5 about "the role of
property in Canadian society". Thus also, "There is no clear
33. See, infra, note48
34. Barnes and Marlin at 154:
"In its enquiries, the Commission has taken the optimistic position that
consensus should be sought..
35. Barnes andMarlin at 153.
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consensus on the abortion question, but the Commission has made
no recommendation as yet, to remove abortion provisions from the
Criminal Code." 36 To take the latter example, the point is that if
consensus was everything to the Commission, surely the fact that
there is no consensus means that the Commission must recommend
repeal of the law. This argument reveals clearly the simplistic
analysis employed by Barnes and Marlin and other inadequacy of
the notion of consensus. It may equally be said that the Commission
has not repealed because there is no consensus for repeal. It may
also be argued that there is a consensus that there is no consensus.
Moreover, it is not adequate to refer merely to consensus "on the
abortion question". The "abortion question" contains a large
number of sub-questions: is it the role of the criminal law to regulate
abortions? If not, shall the law regulate abortions and if so how and
on what "core-value"? If so, what shall be the precise content of
the criminal law and again based on what "core-value"?
It is submitted that the Law Reform Commission, in applying its
philosophy to the abortion question, has again acted quite
consistently with a value consensus model. That model, in general
terms, gives the reformer three types of situations to consider. First,
there may exist a consensus for reform of the law. If there is also a
consensus for the content of the reform, and it involves a
"core-value", the reformer will reform in accordance with the
consensus. Secondly, there may exist a consensus in favour of the
status quo and, similarly, the reformer will not reform. But the third
situation, which will always give rise to trouble, is where there is no
consensus, or consensus on only a number of a larger number of
related questions. Leaving aside the odd definition of consensus
mentioned by Barnes and Marlin, 3 7 and assuming that there is no
consensus as to the abortion question, what does the Commission
do? In both cases cited by Barnes and Marlin the Commission opted
for keeping the status quo. In general, the third situation where
there is no consensus is the difficult one, and a law reformer needs a
perspective which provides a useful response to it. A value
antagonism model may dictate possible alternatives in such cases,
and these alternatives should be explored.
The fact that the Commission has evidently opted for the status
quo has two important consequences. First, that is the usual
36. BarnesandMarlin at 155
37. Supra, note 18
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response on a value consensus model, and thus makes it more likely
that the Commission adheres to that model. 38 The weakness of the
value-consensus model when there is no consensus stems from the
very general nature of the consensus as to core values required and
the fact that if there is no consensus as to anything concerning a
particular question, there is no mandate for the reformer to do
anything. Hence the reformer must opt for the status quo. The
second consequence is that these examples deomonstrate yet
another misunderstanding by Barnes and Marlin, for they state that I
have not shown that the Commission has accepted the status quo of
an unjust system. Not only have they thus ignored specific examples
in the original comment, 39 but they also provide two additional
ones.
Thus, the examples provided by Barnes and Marlin do not
provide evidence for the assertion that for the Commission,
consensus is not the whole story. Not only is acceptance of the
status quo an important indication, but it may equally be said that
the Commission has failed to act because there is no consensus.
Indeed, the rest of Barnes and Marlin's response supports the view
that the Commission has adopted the value-consensus model. They
do say that the Commission has "questioned the value base of the
present law at every stage",40 yet do not deal with the specific
41
example of explicit failure to question raised in the original paper.
Barnes and Marlin submit that I should have shown that"

. . .

no

moral consensus in society is possible to any significant extent, and
the striving for consensus is misguided." 42 The interesting thing
about that contention is that it argues that my original paper failed,
not because I was wrong and the Commission has not adopted the
value-consensus model, but because I did not show that the model
has no utility. Even assuming that I believe that the model has no
utility, that was not the objective of the original paper, and of
course, it does not go to the question of whether or not the
Commission has adopted the model.
38. Goode, supra, note 4 at 656 n.15 in which this conclusion is more than
adequately documented
39. Id; see also id. at 660-662 (compounding); id. at 666 n.58; and 670 n.72 which
contains a quotation from the Commission defining core values as being those of
society as it is
40. Barnes and Marlin at 153
41. Goode, supra, note 4 at 656, quoting Law Reform Commission of Canada,
Working Paper No. 4, Discovery (CriminalProcedure), June 1974 at 1-2
42. Barnes and Marlin at 156
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Barnes and Marlin also cite Radzinowicz and King 43 to show that
the notion of even very limited consensus is important, which, of
course, again does not go to the question of whether or not the
Commission has adopted the value consensus model. It is submitted
to be "significant" that the only source cited by the learned authors
which is not a publication of the Law Reform Commission on
Barnes himself, is a quotation defending the notion of consensus.
The quotation itself is worthy of comment. Radzinowicz and King
state:
They [ the "radicals"] have overstated the heterogeneity of
social values, ignoring the large measure of consensus, even
among the oppressed, in condemning the theft and violence that
make up the bulk of traditional [sic!] crime ... And they have
indulged in exaggerated hopes of human nature, been overoptimistic about what society will tolerate, either now or in the
future. .. 44
The quotation is unhelpful for two fundamental reasons. First,
opponents of the value-consensus model do not deny that small
groups of people in society may agree that petty theft is a Bad
Thing. But that does not mean that the thieves agree, and those who
live from the proceeds of thievery. Moreover, that is not really the
kind' of broad social consensus upon which, surely, adherents of the
value-consensus model would wish to base law, and the quotation
does not advert to whether such a small consensus is useful for any
specific purpose. Secondly, the quotation assumes that which it sets
out to prove. To say that the "radical" criminologist is "over
optimistic about what society will tolerate" assumes that it is
possible to know what society will tolerate, that it is society that is
doing the tolerating, and that a society is capable of doing any such
thing.
There is one further major misunderstanding which must be
discussed. Barnes and Marlin state:
In Goode's view, the Commission far too often pronounces on
the nature and value 4of5 the criminal law in terms that suggest that
is little or no dissent.
The example given to support that view is my criticism of the
Commission for using a "we-us" terminology. But the quotation
43. Times Literary Supplement, Sept. 26, 1975, 1089, cited by Barnes and Marlin
at4
44. Id.
45. Barnes and Marlin at 152
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above does not represent the thrust of my criticism. I selected from
the working papers various passages which used the words "we",
"us" and "them" in discussion of reform in a context which
showed that the Commission was talking about crime in terms of a
"we-us" representing the victims of crime, the so called
non-criminals, the law abiding right thinking citizen, and in terms
of a "them" representing the criminals. 46 The context made it
equally clear that, although "we" included the Commission, it did
not mean the Commission only. The point of my criticism is and
was that such a distinction is insupportable and dangerous. Anyone
may become a criminal at any time. It is simply not possible to
divide a society into "we" the non-criminals and "them" the
criminals. Four comments flow from the distinction. First, it will be
recalled that the Commission has titled a report "Our Criminal
Law".

47

Whoever "we" may be, the criminal law is not property

susceptible to rights of ownership in any group of persons, nor
should it be, despite the fact that the present criminal law appears to
be far more responsive to the rights of certain groups in the society
than others. Secondly, it will be noted that the distinction is
simplistic and black/white in purpose, and thus arguably a product
of inadequate philosophical consideration. 48 Third, the dichotomy
between "we" and "them" is a fiction. Criminality is a continuum:
a flexible, controversial, everchanging line between the black of
criminality and the white of virtue. At the interface, there is no
black and there is no white, for the extent of the line is often the
result of formal factors having little relevance to the social and
behavioral realities in question. Fourthly, it is a convenient and
comforting philosophical prop if one can believe in a "we-us"
"them-they" model of criminal behaviour. Bearing in mind how
often one hears of a "war" on crime, it is interesting to recall that
the U.S. Army encouraged its soldiers to think of the enemy as
"gooks" rather than human beings, for it is easier on the conscience
to kill a "gook". Whether or not that is legitimate in a state of war,
it is submitted to be both an inadequate and a dangerous approach to
49
the problem of crime and reform of the criminal process.
46. See Goode, supra, note 4 at 670-671
47. Our CriminalLaw (March 1975)
48. See the analogy, supra, note 33
49. See Krisberg, Crime and Privilege: Toward A New Criminology (N.J.:
Prentice Hall, 1975) at 4; Fox, "The XYY Offender: A Modem Myth" (1971), 62
J.C.L.C. & P.S. 59 at 71-72 quoted in Goode, supra, note 4 at 671
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4. Conclusion:The Status Quo
Barnes and Marlin have in fact said very little that was not evident
from what the Commission itself has said, and notably, they have
failed to discuss the real issues of law, policy and ideology involved
in this question. Take for example Barnes' and Marlin's second
conclusion - the first is dealt with above. 50 They state:
.. . he has to show something like one of the following ... (2)
that by failing to examine the class biases in our inherited legal
system the Commission has uncritically accepted a status quo and
endorsed an unjust system. 51
Barnes and Marlin do not concede, of course, that that has been
done. Yet consider the following evidence;
(a) Consider the following two statements by the Commission to
which emphasis has been added:
.. . there are others [values] which, though not essential to any
society, are necessary for our society - they help to make it the
sought of society it is. So when such values are contravened and
threatened we call into play the use of the criminal law 52
[core-values] . . . essential to the existence of our own particular
society as it is. 53.
(b) The original paper contained a quite extensive discussion of
the crime of "compounding" an offence, in relation to the
Commission's view that restitution is a "central consideration in
sentencing and dispositions". 54 Essentially, the Commission opts
for restitution only as formally structured through the criminal
process: by courts, in diversion schemes, and in determining a
proper date for an offender's parole. 55 Hence, the Commission does
not recommend the abolition of the crime of compounding and other
similar offences which make it an offence to become involved in
restitution outside the criminal process. In substance the Commission has kept the status quo. 5 6 It recommends a different emphasis,
and little details are different: but there is absolutely no discussion
50. Supra, note 42
51. Barnes and Marlin at 156
52. Law Reform Commission, Working Paper 10, Limits of CriminalLaw (1975)
at 36, quoted in Goode, supra, note 4 at 655 n.8
53. Law Reform Commission Report, Our Criminal Law (March 1976) at 20,
quoted in Goode, supra, note 4 at 670 n.72
54. Law Reform Commission, Working Paper 5, Restitution and Compensation
(October 1974) at 14
55. Id.
56. See also Goode, supra, note 4 at 662 n.41
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of the major question of whether restitution without the involvement
of the criminal process should be permitted.
Why should restitution always be within the ambit of the criminal
process? In the original paper, I suggested why the crime of
compounding was developed to prevent private restitution and
indeed, the Commission had come to a similar conclusion. 57 In
essence, I suggested that the purpose of the rule was to strengthen
the King's political position and his authority and to guarantee a
source of revenue. 58 The Commission seems to think the
development of the crime "well intentioned": 59 an amazing
proposition. In any event, the Commission opted in this case for the
systemic status quo, with no discussion of the larger questions
involved. In the original paper I suggested a value-consensus
justification for the crime of compounding: 60 but Barnes and Marlin
do not discuss that, either.
(c) Some discussion of the acceptance by the Commission of the
status quo is included within the text above, and it is not intended to
repeat that analysis again. 61 Suffice it to say that Barnes and Marlin
provide two further examples of the Commission adopting the status
quo: the reform of abortion law, and offences against property
rights.
(d) Symptomatic of acceptance of the status quo is failure to
question it: and Barnes and Marlin do not deal with the explicit
failure to question quoted in the original paper from the Working
Paper on Discovery. There it was said, inter alia:
• . . it is unnecessary, perhaps even unwise to go beyond the

mere statement of these basic questions. 62
It is submitted that all of these are examples of an uncritical
acceptance of the status quo of society. Is this an "unjust system"?
There can, of course, be no "objective" answer to such a question
and indeed, the fact that Barnes and Marlin require demonstration of
the "unjustness" of the present "system" as a fact is a further
indication of their simplistic attitude toward this question. The
question of whether or not "justice" or an objective fact capable of
demonstration would take far more time and space than is possible
57. Working Paper 5, supra, note 54 at 9

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Goode, supra, note 4 at 661
Working Paper 5, supra, note 54 at 9
See Goode, supra, note 4 and 660, and at 660 n.36.
Supra, notes 35-39
See, for the full quotation and citation, Goode, supra, note 4 at 656
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here. Questions of objectivity aside, however, a number of
comments may be made about the kind of status quo which the
Commission has accepted.
An opposite example is the abortion example provided by Barnes
and Marlin. To accept the status quo for the time being, as the
Commission has done, is no doubt prudent for its own survival, if
not the survival of working class women. Abortion has been an
issue for as long as records exist; hence, the origins of the
common law offence of abortion which was replaced by statute in
1803 are obscure. 6 3 Nevertheless, it is submitted for the purposes of
this discussion that the law arose and developed from a concurrence
of theological and secular interests. Upon the theological side, the
law against abortion was probably based upon the extensive
influence of the medieval church. Whether or not the matter was
based upon objective theological teachings is not a matter
susceptible of full discussion here. Equally, and perhaps more
importantly in modern times, the medieval ruling class had a clear
vested interest in the prevention of abortion. The manor lord wanted
plenty of hungry and hence willing serfs to fill his land: the more
serfs the serfs had to feed, the more dependent upon the lord and his
manor the serfs would be. The lord did not have to worry about
overpopulation: the overpopulation could be mobilized into 64an army
and perhaps win more land, power, and money for the lord.
Modem Canadian abortion law may be subjected to a similar
analysis. It cannot be seriously argued that the "therapeutic
abortion" provisions of the Criminal Code represent more than 6a5
cosmetic patch upon the fabric of the original criminal law.
Again, it is in the interests of the Canadian upper and middle classes
to keep cheap and available abortions from the working class. The
obvious result of such a policy is that working class families will be
much larger than would otherwise be the case and it is submitted
that, the larger the family, the more dependent upon the status quo
that family will be.
Large families are one of the more important reasons for the
dependence of the working class upon the status quo. The woman
63. See, for a brief but good general account, Dickens, Abortion And The Law
(1966), Chapter 1; de Valk, Morality And Law In, CanadianPolitics (Montreal:
Palm, 1974) ch. 1
64. It may also provide a hedge against depletion by epidemic: and indeed it took
the plagues of the fourteenth and fifteenth century to destroy that "system".
65. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s.251
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cannot afford the price of present abortions: 66 the wage earner can
ill afford to strike, or to denounce as dehumanizing or mindless the
job he or she must have to feed, clothe and educate the children.
Often, large families must go into debt, which further ties them to
"the system. ' 16 7 In short, the lack of cheap and available abortion is
one of the factors that shackles the working class to the present
"system". It is, therefore, quite easy to understand why economic
or financial reasons for abortion are not sufficient legal reasons to
have an abortion. It is evident that I think the abortion status quo to
be "unjust". As Dickens has remarked of Dr. Morgentaler's case:
It may identify the moment when a woman's obligation to
continue an unwanted pregnancy ceased to be
merely her
misfortune, but become recognized as an injustice. 6 8
Present Canadian abortion law contains many manifest injustices. A
69
"therapeutic abortion" requires a hospital committee approval:
but there is no legal requirement that a hospital provide such a
committee. 7 0 The wealthier woman, can, of course, obtain an
66. See the Report of the Committee On the Operation of the Abortion Law (Feb.
1977) summarized in (1977), 3 Commonwealth Law Bull. 254 at 257:
"Despite nation-wide medical care insurance there is a financial deterrent for
some women to obtaining a therapeutic abortion. One out of five women...
paid extra medical fees and in some instances the performance of the operation
was contingent upon payment of the extra fees. These charges were not evenly
distributed among all abortion patients, but affected most of those women who
were young, were less well educated, or were newcomers to Canada."
67. See Dickens, supra, note 63 at 13, quotes from the Report of the
Inter-departmental Committee on Abortion which reported in England in 1939.
Inter alia, the Sixth Main Conclusion is fascinating:
"The law relating to abortion is freely disregarded among women of all types
and classes. Predominant among the causes of the desire for abortion are
economic and financial reasons. In case of poverty or unemployment, the task
of maintaining another child may be felt to be intolerable. When the family is
wholly or largely dependent upon the earnings of the pregnant woman, there
may be an added incentive to cimrinial abortion. Among parents of more
moderate or comfortable means, feat that a lowering of the family's standards
may result. .."
68. Dickens, "The Morgentaler Case: Criminal Process And Abortion Law"
(1976), 14 Osgoode Hall L.J. 229 at 229 citing Turner, "The theme of
Contemporary Social Movements" (1969), 20 Br. J. Sociol. 390
69. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s.251(4)
70. de Valk supra, note 63 at 136-137, where, speaking of Quebec, it is stated:
". .. discovered that only 14 out of 250 provincial hospitals had abortion
committees and that all but one of the 181 abortions during the first ten months
of 1970 had been performed at English-language hospitals in Montreal's West
End."
See also the summary of the report of the Badgley Committee, supra, note 67 at
256:
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abortion. If her expensive gynecologist cannot provide one, she
may be able to afford to fly to another jurisdiction where abortion
laws are less repressive. 71 Neither of these options is open to a
woman of the working class. And yet the Law Reform Commission
has left the problem of abortion untouched. Why? It is one of the
major social-criminal issues in present Canadian society. There is
no consensus, 72 of course, but that should be a reason for
examination of the status quo, and not a reason for leaving it alone.
In present abortion law there is injustice: both because it is unjust to
impose morality and through morality, economic dependence upon
women and families and because the content of the law is of itself
unjust, for it discriminates in operation in favour of the wealthy and
73
in favour of the urbanized middle class.
". .. the number of hospitals eligible to do the abortion procedure was
effectively reduced to two our of every five hospitals in the nation." (emphasis
added)
71. Badgley, id. at 257; see also the commentary by Dickens, id. at 303-304. The
proportion of women varies from 1:5 to 1:6 who fly to the U.S. Dickens comments:
"Access to the convenience of such facilities is limited, of course, to those able
to pay the travel and treatment costs involved."
72. Id. at 255: "no consensus exists for major changes in the law". See also de
Valk, supra, note 63 at 129
73. See the constitutional arguments to this point in Morgentaler v. The Queen
(1975), 20 C.C.C. (2d.) 449; 30 C.R.N.S. 209; 53 D.L.R. (3d.) 161; 4 N.R. 277,
(S.C.C.) discussed in Maksymiuk, "The Abortion Law: A Study of R. v.
Morgentaler" (1974-5), 39 Sask. L.R. 257
See the account of Badgley, supra, note 67 at 255:
"The law is not operating equitably ... The burden of the inequitable
operation of the abortion law tends to fall on women who are less well educated,
who have lower incomes and who live in smaller centres or rural centres with no
direct access to abortion services."
Dickens, id. at 298 and 300 agrees; at 300, he quotes from the report:
"The procedure provided in the Criminal Code for obtaining therapeutic
abortion is in practice illusory for many Canadian women"
At 298, Dickens reports:
"Both proponents and opponents of easier abortion provisions agreed that
particular availability was governed more by geography and economic means
than by the abortion applicant's medical consertion."

